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Vascular surgeons are often called emergently to help treat bleeding patients. These cases may involve unexpected
intraoperative bleeding, bleeding in the pregnant patient, or bleeding in patients in the emergency room. In many
instances, the vascular surgeon is not “on call” and therefore has no legal duty to assist in the care of these patients.
Unfortunately, because many of these types of cases result in litigation, some vascular surgeons refuse to respond to a call
for help. Simply, it is important that vascular surgeons “do the right thing” and answer these requests for assistance. The
legal system recognizes the need to protect physicians who appropriately respond and, therefore, Good Samaritan statutes
were adopted. (J Vasc Surg 2010;51:1572-3.)Society has long recognized the importance of provid-
ing legal protection to an individual or “Good Samaritan”
who “risks his own life or serious injury in attempting to
effect a rescue.”1 Accordingly, 49 states and the District of
Columbia have enacted some form of a Good Samaritan
statute.2 However, the specific criteria and degree of im-
munity provided by these statutes to a Good Samaritan
varies from state to state. All states provide at least some
protection against civil liability for physicians who provide
emergency medical care to a patient as long as the physician
did not have a duty to provide such care. Furthermore, the
care provided by the physician cannot constitute gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. Willful and
wanton conduct is defined as actions in which the actor
“has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character
in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as
to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and
which thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indiffer-
ence to the consequences.”3
To invoke a Good Samaritan statute defense, it is
critical that the physician establishes that he or she had no
pre-existing duty to provide treatment. Clearly, a physician
who is “on call” has a duty to provide emergency care and
thus would be ineligible for protection under a Good
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1572Samaritan statute. Furthermore, a pre-existing relationship
between the patient and the physician or between the
patient and a physician for whom a physician is providing
coverage would similarly exempt a physician from protec-
tion under a Good Samaritan statute. Any contractual
arrangements between the hospital and the defendant phy-
sician would also need to be carefully reviewed to deter-
mine whether a duty, in fact, exists. Finally, hospital rules,
regulations, and bylaws must be reviewed to determine if a
duty is created by membership on a hospital staff.
Other criteria that are reviewed to assess the applicabil-
ity of a Good Samaritan statute include a determination of
whether the care rendered was truly “emergency care”
and/or care administered in a “life-threatening emer-
gency,” rather than care that was rendered in an urgent
situation or even in an elective situation. In Gragg v Neu-
rological Associates, 152 Ga App 586, a physician was
performing a carotid angiogram and encountered difficulty
placing the catheter in the left carotid artery. He requested
that a colleague come to the angiography suite and provide
assistance with positioning of the catheter. Although the
second physician successfully placed the catheter in the left
carotid artery, the patient suffered a stroke postoperatively.
The court eventually determined that the Good Samaritan
statute did not apply because the procedure could have
simply been terminated without significant risk to the pa-
tient’s health. In addition, the court determined that had
the second physician not been available in the hospital, the
operating physician would have been able to complete the
procedure on his own.
In-hospital application of a Good Samaritan statute is
primarily fact-driven. In Grodin v William Beaumont Hos-
pital, 180 Mich. App. 488, the surgeon on call for the
emergency room could not be contacted. A second sur-
geon, Dr Howard, who was not on call, was contacted and
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situation. In the malpractice suit that resulted from Dr
Howard’s care of the patient, the court ruled that Dr
Howard was a Good Samaritan and therefore immune from
a finding of ordinary negligence.
In Matts v Homsi, Mich. App., 308 N.W.2d 284, a
surgeon who was not on call, and had no duty to respond,
was called to the emergency room to treat a patient with
clinical findings suggestive of intra-abdominal bleeding.
The surgeon took the patient to the operating room;
however, the patient continued to do poorly. The patient
was reexplored and found to have multiple holes in the
small bowel that had not been repaired. The patient subse-
quently died. Although a malpractice suit was filed, the
court determined that the surgeon involved was a Good
Samaritan and the case was dismissed.
In Kearns v Superior Court, 204 Cal. App.3d 1325, Dr
Kearns was called urgently to the operating room by a
gynecologist who requested assistance with an ovarian tu-
mor that involved the bowel. Dr Kearns was subsequently
named in a medical malpractice lawsuit that involved his
care of the patient. In this case, even though it was not a
“life-threatening” emergency, the court determined that
the gynecologist could not have safely completed the pro-
cedure by himself and therefore granted Good Samaritan
status to Dr Kearns.
Not all courts have chosen to adopt the position that
Good Samaritan protection may be claimed for in-hospital
occurrences. In Velazquez v Jiminez, 336 N.J. Super.
10,763, the court wrote, “The protection of the Good
Samaritan Act stops at the door of the hospital.”2 This
position appears to be predicated on a belief that physicians
are bound by hospital rules and regulations to provide
emergency services to patients in the hospital. However,
the obligation of a physician to provide emergency services
to in-hospital patients often stems from the fact that the
physician is, in some manner, employed by the hospital.
Absent this type of relationship, it is difficult to argue that aphysician who is not on call and has no previous relation-
ship with a particular patient has any legal obligation to
treat that patient.
Some courts have construed Good Samaritan statutes
to require that the person receiving the assistance not
object,4 whereas still others have required that the physi-
cian neither require nor expect compensation.5 At this
time, however, such requirements are recognized in a mi-
nority of jurisdictions and are often applied in only very
specific fact patterns.
Vascular surgeons are often called on under urgent or
emergency circumstances to control unexpected intraoper-
ative bleeding. Many of these cases result in litigation that
often includes the vascular surgeon. Although the safest
legal approach in these situations would be to decline to
become involved, the only ethical medical approach is to
provide aid to a fellow physician and to treat the patient
with the best possible care. However, if vascular surgeons
must place themselves in the legal line of fire, they should
familiarize themselves with the best legal bulletproof vests.
Good Samaritan statutes were established to encourage
physicians to treat critically ill patients whom they ordi-
narily have no duty to treat. Physicians should be aware of
these statutes and invoke them whenever applicable. The
legal system helps those who help themselves.
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